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Soviet Cadre Changes and Personnel Policy Since Brezhnev's Death

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A Research Paper

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July 1985*

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [redacted]
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Soviet Cadre Changes and Personnel Policy Since Brezhnev's Death

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Summary

*Information available
as of 10 July 1985
was used in this report.*

Leonid Brezhnev's policy of cadre stability—a reaction to the rapid and often capricious personnel turnover of the Khrushchev years—gave Central Committee members a virtual guarantee of lifetime tenure. Their complacency reduced the General Secretary's ability to get his policies executed. The bureaucratic inertia and indiscipline contributed to the decline in economic growth and created a climate conducive to corruption. []

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His successor, Yuriy Andropov, moved decisively to replace key personnel. [] one of Andropov's major goals was to clean out many of the Brezhnev-era appointees who owed no personal loyalty to him or who were too old, incompetent, or corrupt to fulfill their assignments. He focused his efforts on the central party apparatus—the principal overseer of the Soviet bureaucracy—where he appointed three new party secretaries; removed about a third of the heads of the Central Committee's departments, who play a crucial role in party oversight of the economy; and named a new chief of the Party Control Committee, the body overseeing party discipline. In addition, Andropov replaced the first secretaries of Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Leningrad, and Uzbekistan and nearly a fifth of the oblast first secretaries on the Central Committee. Although high-level opposition limited his ability to make major personnel changes in the economic ministries, Andropov was able to replace poor performers in the transport, construction, and machine-building sectors and the planning apparatus—all areas crucial to his efforts to revitalize the economy. []

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Under General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko, high-level personnel turnover in the party and state apparatus slowed. As the leader of the Brezhnev faction, he sought to protect those remaining Central Committee members appointed under his patron. During his 13-month tenure, Chernenko made only one minor personnel change in the central party apparatus, 13 changes among regional party and government leaders, and three changes in the Council of Ministers. Even some of these changes were reportedly made in response to pressure from Andropov proteges, especially Mikhail Gorbachev. []

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Gorbachev, like Andropov, has given personnel change a very high priority. Since he came to power in March 1985, his statements and actions have made it clear that he intends to shake up the party and state bureaucracies in an effort to improve economic performance and consolidate his political strength. At the 23 April Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev solidified

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his control of the Politburo by advancing three of his allies—KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov and party secretaries Yegor Ligachev and Nikolay Ryzhkov—to full membership and probably helped cement his ties to the military by promoting Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov to candidate member. Any remaining doubts regarding his power have been put to rest by his subsequent ousting of his former rival, Grigoriy Romanov, the transfer of Andrey Gromyko to the post of President, the promotion of Eduard Shevardnadze—who was also named Foreign Minister—to full Politburo membership, and the naming of two additional new junior secretaries. In addition, a dozen full and candidate members of the Central Committee have been retired. Eleven new first secretaries also have been appointed in important oblasts—where the party bosses have in the past been full members of the Central Committee—a greater change than witnessed during Chernenko's entire tenure.

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Gorbachev gives every indication of continuing to shake up the party and state apparatus to maintain his political momentum and build support for his campaign to improve economic performance. Rumors of Premier Nikolay Tikhonov's retirement have circulated since Brezhnev's death, and his departure would open the way for wholesale changes in the economic bureaucracy. Gorbachev has an excellent opportunity to install his supporters in positions that qualify for Central Committee status prior to next year's party congress. The election process at lower levels of the party apparatus prior to the congress provides a readymade institutional means for making further changes in key positions.

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All signs so far suggest Gorbachev will preside over the greatest turnover in the Central Committee since Khrushchev's last congress in 1961. The influx of possibly as many as 100 new members into the Central Committee—many of them at his direction—should give him the backing to move ahead aggressively on those programs he has already announced as well as others—both foreign and domestic—which he has yet to surface.

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Soviet Cadre Changes and Personnel Policy Since Brezhnev's Death

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The Importance of Personnel Turnover

From Stalin's time, Soviet leaders have used the party's control of personnel to place supporters in key party and governmental posts and retire or demote their opponents. This power has helped cement the loyalty of lower level officials to a new boss and proved an effective way to force the traditionally inert bureaucracy to carry out his programs.


To consolidate and maintain his power, any general secretary must build a base of support within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Politburo and Secretariat, key officials in the Council of Ministers, and regional party and government leaders are members of this body (see chart).¹

The Central Committee is, by party statutes, the highest political authority between party congresses. It elects the General Secretary and selects the members of the Politburo and Secretariat. Typically meeting only two or three times a year, the Committee in most cases rubberstamps decisions made by the Politburo. The Politburo, in fact, uses Central Committee plenums mainly as a sounding board for leadership policies and to provide a facade of broader consultation and approval. Occasionally, however, the Committee has played an autonomous role. In 1957, for example, it reversed the decision by Khrushchev's opponents to oust him as First Secretary and instead removed his Politburo opponents from the leadership.

Under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the de facto power of Central Committee members probably

¹ The last party congress, in 1981, elected 319 full members—nearly 300 of whom hold positions in the party or government bureaucracy—and 156 candidate, or nonvoting, members. This study focuses almost exclusively on changes among full members rather than candidates, who hold posts of lesser importance and cannot vote on issues, like the election of party secretaries or Politburo members.

USSR: Occupation of Full Central Committee Members Elected in 1981



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^a Primarily government economic officials.

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increased. Brezhnev virtually guaranteed them life-time tenure; nearly 90 percent of the surviving full Central Committee members elected at one congress were reelected five years later at the next one. Soviet media subsequently alleged that the resulting complacency of high-level officialdom contributed to a decline in economic growth and created conditions conducive to corruption.

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Personnel Policy Since Brezhnev

Since Brezhnev's death, his successors have significantly stepped up the pace of personnel turnover and initiated the process of generational change among

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The New Officials

There is limited information available about the age, education, and early careers of the prospective Central Committee members. The 57 new officials for whom data are available are, on the average, about 53 years old. Although this is much younger than the officials they replaced, who were almost all in their sixties or seventies, it is only slightly younger than the average age of the first-time Central Committee members elected in 1981. []

Because of their age, most of the prospective Committee members—about 75 percent of those for whom data are available—did not join the CPSU until after Stalin's death. Some joined early in the 1960s and a few after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. As recently as 1976, in contrast, less than 10 percent of the new full members elected to the Central Committee had joined the party in the post-Stalin era, and in 1981 a little less than half of the new members came from this group. []

Of the 46 officials whose professional backgrounds are known, just over half have the engineering training traditional for Soviet leaders and over 20 percent have an agricultural background—about the same mix as in the group of officials they replaced. Only a small number—about 7 percent—are economists or lawyers, and some, like Vitaliy Fedorchuk, have a background in the police and armed forces. []

Their career experiences have differed from those of the officials they replaced:

- *The Central Committee members-to-be have enjoyed much greater physical and professional security than their elders, whose lives and careers were threatened by Stalin's purges and the destruction and chaos of World War II.*
- *Most entered the party during the Khrushchev years—a time of repudiation of Stalin's theses on the intensification of the class struggle and the primacy of heavy industry and a period of cultural thaw and economic experimentation.*
- *The new officials matured politically during a time when the Kremlin had abandoned its isolationism and risen to superpower status.*
- *A handful joined the party after Khrushchev's fall in 1964, and most began their political ascendancy when, in reaction to Khrushchev's frequent reshuffling of personnel and organizations, cadre stability had become the rule and organizational change proceeded at an almost glacial pace.* []

The impact of these career differences is not clear. Because the new officials have yet to achieve Central Committee membership, they have not enjoyed the public prominence that might make it possible to assess their policy preferences and leadership style from analysis of their speeches and writings. []

the Soviet political elite. About 70 new officials have been promoted to positions that have in the past warranted election to full membership in the Central Committee (see inset). Thus, with several months to go before a new Central Committee is elected at the 27th Party Congress, the number of new officials likely to achieve full Central Committee membership already exceeds the 68 new officials elected in 1981. Given the natural attrition rate among senior Soviet leaders and with additional party elections at the oblast and republic levels slated for later this year,

overall turnover in the Central Committee probably will amount to over 25 percent, the highest rate since Khrushchev's last congress in 1961. []

For Yuriy Andropov, a general secretary with few career ties to the bureaucratic elite and a professed commitment to revitalizing the Soviet economy, rapid renewal of cadres was an especially urgent goal.

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General Secretary Andropov (right) at a June 1983 Supreme Soviet session with Brezhnev and guard leaders Chernenko (left) and Tikhonov.

one of Andropov's major goals was to clean out many of the Brezhnev-era appointees who owed no personal loyalty to him or who were too old, incompetent, or corrupt to fulfill their assignments. He underscored this goal with a flurry of appointments in his first few weeks in office.

however, Andropov met significant resistance from party secretary Konstantin Chernenko, Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, and other Brezhnev supporters who—probably with good reason—saw themselves as targets of Andropov's cadre renewal efforts.

Andropov's efforts to remove older and incompetent ministers were also meeting stiff opposition from others in the Politburo, including Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, who supported Andropov on most other issues.

Andropov's response was to focus his attention on the central party apparatus—the sector of the bureaucracy over which the General Secretary enjoys the greatest control. In April 1983 he appointed Yegor Ligachev, the First Secretary from Tomsk Oblast, as head of the Central Committee department that controls personnel assignments. At about the same time, he gave party secretary Mikhail Gorbachev responsibility for supervising organizational matters, thus displacing Chernenko, who had exercised this function under Brezhnev.

Konstantin *Chernenko*, who succeeded Andropov in February 1984, had strong ties to the Brezhnev bureaucratic elite from his days as Brezhnev's assistant and had been less critical than Andropov of the economic bureaucracy's performance. He had, therefore, fewer reasons than his predecessor to call for a changing of the guard in the party and state apparatus. His succession reportedly was welcome news to many officials whose careers had been threatened by Andropov's cadre renewal campaign.

In his inaugural speech as General Secretary, Chernenko hinted at his intention to reverse Andropov's personnel policies, pledging to look out for the interests of party cadres and praising the work performed by the regional party first secretaries on the Central Committee. In his speech to the Red Army Komsomol Conference in May 1984, he indicated that younger personnel had to be brought in but stressed that they needed to be nurtured by experienced cadres. To judge from Soviet press accounts, Chernenko made these same points again at a Politburo meeting in October. He also returned to this theme in an article in the party's theoretical journal *Kommunist* in December 1984.

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During Chernenko's tenure, the pace of personnel change slowed. Only half as many full members of the Central Committee were affected by personnel moves as under Andropov, and many of the changes were the result of deaths or voluntary retirements. []

Nonetheless, on several occasions Chernenko publicly stated his commitment to continuing the campaign to remove corrupt officials begun by Andropov. Chernenko's regime continued the anticorruption drive in several Soviet republics, executed the director of a prestigious Moscow food store for corruption, and stripped former Minister of Internal Affairs Shchelokov of his military rank shortly before his reported suicide in December. []

party workers that those who cannot attune themselves to change must "get out of the way." A Soviet newspaper editor who reportedly attends Secretariat sessions told US Embassy officers that under Gorbachev the Politburo has decided to break with Brezhnev's policy of promoting regional party leaders from within their local organizations and do more cross-posting to break up local cliques and minimize corruption. []

The personnel changes that have occurred since Brezhnev's death have varied from sector to sector of the party and state bureaucracy (see table 1). Personnel changes have had the greatest impact on the central party apparatus, where nearly half the officials have been affected, and among regional leaders, while the government's economic bureaucracy has been less affected. This may reflect the greater control the General Secretary has over the first two groups and Premier Tikhonov's success until now in protecting many of his subordinates. The sections that follow describe in detail the major personnel changes that have taken place. []

Changes in the Central Party Apparatus

The personnel changes in the central party apparatus, while few in absolute terms, have been among the most significant moves made by the Politburo since Brezhnev's death. Their significance arises from the powerful role that members of the central party apparatus play in overseeing the other branches of the Soviet bureaucracy. []

The Secretariat

Andropov presided over the most extensive changes in the Secretariat since the early Brezhnev era. Nikolay Ryzhkov, Ligachev, and Romanov were appointed party secretaries. All three appointments reflected Andropov's preoccupation with improving Soviet economic performance as well as his efforts to consolidate his power. []

Ryzhkov, Andropov's first appointment to the Secretariat, had little background in party affairs. He had

Gorbachev's power under Chernenko was adequate to see that personnel turnover did not stop and major cases of corruption were still exposed. He probably opted to move carefully because he felt that aggressive advocacy of stepped-up personnel changes might reduce his chances to succeed Chernenko. Since becoming General Secretary in March 1985, Gorbachev has demonstrated that, like Andropov, he intends to move against Brezhnev-era holdovers in key party and economic posts (see inset). In Gorbachev's first few months in office, several ministers criticized under Andropov stepped down and a deputy premier who was an old Brezhnev crony was fired. The leaderships of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) Council of Ministers and several regional party organizations were also reshuffled. []

In his April plenum speech, Gorbachev called for rejuvenating the bureaucracy's ranks and attacked stagnation of cadres. In a speech in Leningrad, he told

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Gorbachev's Hit List

25X1 Gorbachev has made it clear he intends to overcome entrenched resistance to his domestic programs by cleaning house, if necessary. He warned party activists in a speech in Leningrad that foot-draggers must turn over a new leaf "or simply get out of the way and stop interfering." []

At a science and technology conference in June 1985, he served notice to the economic bureaucracy that managers wedded to old methods for stimulating economic growth cannot "accompany us on our path." He accused the ministries and Gosplan of efforts to block the economic experiment and of continuing old, resource-intensive methods of economic growth. To underscore his seriousness, Gorbachev implicitly or explicitly criticized the following ministers and other officials at the conference:

- Ivan Kazanets, Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy, for failing to adhere to the party policy favoring the reequipping of existing industrial enterprises over the construction of new ones and repeated failure to achieve planned output targets. In July 1985 Kazanets was fired.
- Viktor Fedorov, Minister of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry, for failure to make better use of imported machinery and failure to keep his promises to the Politburo.
- Konstantin Belyak, Minister of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Fodder Production, for requesting more investment while asking for lower production targets.

- Aleksey Yashin, Minister of the Construction Materials Industry, for a similar resource-intensive approach to economic growth. He was also fired in July.
- Krasnoyarsk Kray First Secretary Pavel Fedirko, implicitly, for failure to see to it that resources invested in his region brought the expected economic return. (This criticism may have also been aimed at Secretary Vladimir Dolgikh, who had once headed this organization and is generally responsible for energy and heavy industry, the areas criticized by Gorbachev.)
- Gosplan chief Nikolay Baybakov, implicitly, for failures in planning and lack of support for the economic experiment.
- Minister of Finance Vasiliy Garbuzov, implicitly, for supporting the ministries in undermining the economic experiment. []

Gorbachev has created expectations that these officials will be punished or dismissed if they fail to improve their performance. He probably realizes that failure to follow up his criticisms will indicate to managers that his words are only rhetoric and that he lacks the power to back them up. The firing of Kazanets and Yashin and the retirement of several other ministers criticized in the past give clear testimony that he will not allow this to happen. []

25X1 served as director of the huge Ural machine-building complex in Sverdlovsk, the bailiwick of former Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko, then as First Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) responsible for heavy industry. Andropov named him in November 1982 to head a new department of the Central Committee responsible for economic planning and reform. []

Ligachev was tapped by Andropov in April 1983 to head the Central Committee's Organizational Party Work Department, a unit with a key role in the campaign to energize the party bureaucracy. []

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Table 1
Personnel Actions Affecting Full
Central Committee Members
Since Brezhnev's Death

	Under Andropov (15 months)	Under Chernenko (13 months)	Under Gorbachev (4 months)
Central party apparatus			
Promotions	4	1	4
Lateral transfers	3	0	0
Demotions	0	0	0
Retirements/deaths	6	1	1
Total actions	13	2	5
Regional party and state officials			
Promotions	8	0	3
Lateral transfers	9	6	6
Demotions	4	1	1
Retirements/deaths	13	6	6
Total actions	34	13	16
Economic officials			
Promotions	3	1	0
Lateral transfers	2	0	1
Demotions	3	0	0
Retirements/deaths	10	2	4
Total actions	18	3	5
National security officials			
Promotions	2	5	2
Lateral transfers	4	2	1
Demotions	2	2	0
Retirements/deaths	0	4	0
Total actions	8	13	3
Others			
Promotions	0	0	1
Lateral transfers	2	1	0
Demotions	0	0	0
Retirements/deaths	1	3	1
Total actions	3	4	2
Total actions	76	35	31
Total individuals affected	72	35	30

[redacted] Ligachev's assignment required him to work closely with Gorbachev, the party secretary responsible for cadres. Ligachev was promoted to the Secretariat in December 1983, shortly before Andropov's death. [redacted]

Romanov entered the Secretariat in June 1983, after 13 years as First Secretary in Leningrad. [redacted]

[redacted] His public appearances and the obituaries he signed after moving to Moscow indicate that he was supervising the machine-building sector and defense industries. This assignment suggests that Andropov's appreciation of his economic talents played a major role in his move to Moscow. Bringing Romanov to the capital probably also served Andropov's political purposes at that time by further diluting Chernenko's authority in the Secretariat. [redacted]

Chernenko made no new appointments to the Secretariat during his 13-month tenure. He failed to do so despite the fact that the Secretariat was clearly understaffed as a result of his election as party chief. This probably reflected his overall political weakness and limited mandate as a transitional leader. Senior secretaries Gorbachev and Romanov, who were also full Politburo members, were forced to broaden their responsibilities to pick up the slack. Romanov, for instance, apparently began to oversee the security organs—the police and the military—while Gorbachev assumed responsibility for ideology in addition to his oversight of agriculture and cadres. [redacted]

General Secretary *Gorbachev*, in contrast, has already made important personnel changes in the Secretariat. In April, in a striking demonstration of power, he advanced two of his key clients, Ligachev and Ryzhkov, directly to full membership in the Politburo and appointed a new junior secretary, Viktor Nikonov, to

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General Secretary Gorbachev (standing) with (left to right) party secretaries Ligachev, Romanov, and Ryzhkov, Defense Minister Sokolov, and party secretary Nikonov at a May 1985 ceremony. Ligachev and Ryzhkov were promoted to full Politburo member, Sokolov to candidate member, and Nikonov to the Secretariat at the April 1985 Central Committee Plenum. Romanov was ousted in July 1985.

oversee Soviet agriculture. Any doubts regarding the extent of his power were removed in July when Gorbachev ousted Romanov from the leadership and added two new secretaries, Leningrad party boss Lev Zaykov and former Sverdlovsk party chief Boris Yel'tsin (see inset).

Ligachev has taken over the responsibility for ideology, successively held by Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev. His recent appearance at the installation of Zaykov's successor in Leningrad indicates that he continues to oversee personnel matters and probably will play a crucial role in organizing the upcoming party congress. [redacted] of all the members of the Politburo, he is the closest to Gorbachev, and some claim he has already been designated "second secretary" and will stand in for Gorbachev when he is out of Moscow. In addition to his domestic responsibilities, Ligachev probably will play a growing role in foreign policy, having already succeeded Gorbachev as chairman of one of the Supreme Soviet's foreign affairs commissions.

Ryzhkov's promotion probably will strengthen his authority over economic policy.

[redacted] Ryzhkov may be in line for further promotion, possibly to head Gosplan or even to succeed Tikhonov as Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier).

Nikonov, the new secretary for agriculture, is almost certainly a Gorbachev protege. He was transferred to Moscow as deputy minister of agriculture in 1979—a move that almost certainly required Gorbachev's approval as party agricultural czar at the time. Nikonov may be in line for promotion to the Politburo during the next few years, as his recent predecessors all attained that rank.

Zaykov, who succeeded Romanov as Leningrad First Secretary in 1983, probably was brought into the Secretariat to replace Romanov as overseer of defense industry and machine building.

[redacted] Zaykov has a background in defense industry, although his published biography does not reflect this. Gorbachev presided at Zaykov's installation in Leningrad in 1983 and when he visited the city in May 1985 he praised Zaykov's management of the economy there and implied that he and Zaykov enjoyed a close working relationship. Before his appointment as Leningrad party chief, Zaykov lacked any experience in the party apparatus, having spent his entire career in economic management positions and as mayor of Leningrad.

Gorbachev's other appointment, Boris Yel'tsin, is a trained engineer who has, since April 1985, headed the Central Committee Construction Department. Ryzhkov, whose career overlapped with Yel'tsin's when they worked in Sverdlovsk, may have recommended him to Gorbachev as someone who could help straighten out the chronic problems in the construction sector.

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Central Committee Departments

Andropov also presided over other high-level changes in the central party apparatus (see table 2). At the June 1983 plenum, for example, 70-year-old Mikhail Solomentsev, the RSFSR's Premier, was named to

replace the late Arvid Pel'she as head of the Party Control Committee. In December 1983 Solomentsev was promoted to full membership in the Politburo.

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Table 2
Appointments to the Central Party Apparatus

Name	Position	Date of Appointment
Nikolay Ryzhkov	Party secretary	November 1982
Viktor Mishin	First Secretary of the Komsomol	December 1982
Boris Stukalin	Chief of Propaganda Department	December 1982
Stepan Chervonenko	Chief of Cadres Abroad Department	January 1983
Veniamin Afonin	Chief of Chemical Industry Department	February 1983
Yegor Ligachev	Chief of Organizational Party Work Department	April 1983
Mikhail Solomentsev	Chairman of Party Control Committee	June 1983
Grigoriy Romanov	Party secretary	June 1983
Klavdiy Bogolyubov	Chief of General Department	July 1983
Vadim Medvedev	Chief of Science and Educational Institutions Department	August 1983
Nikolay Kruchina	Chief of Administration of Affairs	December 1983
Yegor Ligachev	Party secretary	December 1983
Ivan Yastrebov	Chief of Heavy Industry Department	March 1984
Boris Yel'tsin	Chief of Construction Department	April 1985
Viktor Nikonov	Party secretary	April 1985
Arkadiy Vol'skiy	Chief of Machine-Building Department	May 1985
Georgiy Razumovskiy	Chief of Organizational Party Work Department	June 1985
Lev Zaykov	Party secretary	July 1985
Boris Yel'tsin	Party secretary	July 1985

Solomentsev may have been a compromise choice for the sensitive post of chief watchdog for party discipline. Given the potential importance of this post in Andropov's campaign against corruption, the General Secretary might have been expected to entrust it to a younger, more aggressive figure. Chernenko and the other members of the Brezhnev old guard probably would have preferred that one of their own be chosen. Solomentsev, while having no known previous ties to Andropov, was not a member of the Brezhnev clique; unlike previous RSFSR Premiers, he had not been elevated to full Politburo membership during Brezhnev's tenure. This "independent" status may ultimately have been the key to his selection. []

Andropov also presided over the most extensive changes in the Central Committee departments since the period immediately following Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. Eight of the 23 department chiefs—all men

in their seventies—were removed and replaced by men whose average age was 57. Two of the new officials, Nikolay Kruchina, head of Administration of Affairs, and Veniamin Afonin, who heads the Chemical Industry Department, have connections with Gorbachev. Afonin was a party official in Gorbachev's former home base of Stavropol', and Kruchina worked for several years as first deputy chief of the Agriculture Department, which Gorbachev supervised. Vadim Medvedev, the new head of the Science and Educational Institutions Department, may have had ties to Romanov, having made his way up the Leningrad ideological hierarchy when Romanov was oblast second secretary. []

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Under *Chernenko* there was only one minor personnel change in the central party apparatus. In March 1984, in a move apparently designed to free party secretary Dolgikh to focus on his broader responsibilities for overseeing heavy industry, Ivan Yastrebov, his former first deputy, was appointed chief of the Heavy Industry Department. Yastrebov, who had served as first deputy since 1962, is 73 years old and a candidate member of the Central Committee. []

Under *Gorbachev*, three Central Committee departments have already changed hands. In late March the 65-year-old chief of the Construction Department, Ivan Dmitriyev, was named deputy premier of the RSFSR and the 71-year-old head of the Machine-Building Department, Vasilii Frolov, was retired. Both men had been in their posts since the 1960s. Dmitriyev was replaced by Sverdlovsk Oblast First Secretary Boris Yel'tsin—who has since been raised to the rank of party secretary—and Frolov was replaced by Arkadiy Vol'skiy, his former deputy and, more recently, an adviser to Andropov. Following Ligachev's election to the Politburo, Gorbachev named a protege, Georgiy Razumovskiy—First Secretary of Krasnodar Kray—to lead the department overseeing personnel appointments, preserving his control over this important area. Gorbachev probably intends to target a number of the remaining Brezhnev-era holdovers for removal before next year's party congress. []

Changes in the Regional Party Apparatus

Numerous Central Committee members serving in the regional party apparatus have also been affected by personnel changes since Brezhnev's death. This group makes up the core of the Central Committee, accounting for approximately 40 percent of its voting members. []

Top-Level Republic Leadership

Andropov was especially successful in rejuvenating the top levels of the republic party apparatus (see table 3). Solomentsev's transfer to the Party Control Committee, for example, enabled the General Secretary to promote Vitaliy Vorotnikov to Premier of the RSFSR, the most important post in that republic, where there is no separate party organization. The deaths of two candidate members of the Politburo—

Belorussian First Secretary Tikhon Kiselev and Uzbek First Secretary Sharaf Rashidov—and the transfer of Azerbaijan boss Geydar Aliyev to Moscow also created openings in republic-level posts. Romanov's move to the Secretariat also created a vacancy at the top of the Leningrad party organization, which historically has played a more influential role in the CPSU than most republic organizations.² []

Vorotnikov had been recalled from his post as Soviet Ambassador to Cuba in 1982 to replace Brezhnev's crony Medunov as First Secretary in Krasnodar.

The promotions of Nikolay Slyun'kov in Belorussia and Lev Zaykov in Leningrad, who was subsequently posted to Moscow as party secretary, illustrated Andropov's preference for competent economic managers and his willingness to disregard the lack of extensive background in party work. []

[] Slyun'kov's experience in the party bureaucracy had been limited to a two-year stint as head of the Minsk City Party Committee. He had spent most of his career in industry as manager of the Minsk Tractor Plant and as Gosplan's overseer of the machine-building sector. []

The new First Secretaries in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan—Kyamran Bagirov and Inamdzhani Usmanhodzhayev—were more conventional appointments than Slyun'kov and Zaykov, having worked their way up the local party apparatus. []

² A major effect of these changes in Leningrad, Belorussia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan and the later transfer of Shevardnadze from Georgia to Moscow has been to reduce the representation of key regional party organizations in the Central Committee and Politburo. The new First Secretaries in Belorussia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, for instance, are not yet members of the Central Committee and so remain ineligible to attain the Politburo rank of their predecessors until at least the next party congress. []

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Table 3
Appointments to Leadership Posts
in the Soviet Republics

Name	Position	Date of Appointment
Kyamran Bagirov	First Secretary, Azerbaijan	December 1982
Nikolay Slyun'kov	First Secretary, Belorussia	January 1983
Arnol'd Ryuytel'	Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, Estonia	April 1983
Timofey Osetrov	Second Secretary, Uzbekistan	May 1983
Yevgeniy Kachalovskiy	First Deputy Premier, Ukraine	June 1983
Vitaliy Vorotnikov	Premier, Russian Republic	June 1983
Vladimir Brovnikov	Premier, Belorussia	July 1983
Gennadiy Bartoshevich	Second Secretary, Belorussia	August 1983
Inamdzhani Usmanhodzhayev	First Secretary, Uzbekistan	November 1983
Akil Salimov	Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, Uzbekistan	December 1983
Boris Nikol'skiy	Second Secretary, Georgia	January 1984
Bayken Ashimov	Premier, Kazakhstan	March 1984
Nursultan Nazarbayev	Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, Kazakhstan	March 1984
Boris Pugo	First Secretary, Latvia	April 1984
Gayrat Khadyrov	Premier, Uzbekistan	November 1984
Dzhumbar Patiashvili	First Secretary, Georgia	July 1985

Bagirov's candidacy was supported by his predecessor, Aliyev. Usmanhodzhayev's predecessor, Rashidov, a longtime candidate member of the Politburo, reportedly died in disgrace because of a scandal over the doctoring of cotton statistics. Perhaps in reaction to this scandal, Usmanhodzhayev has actively pursued the anticorruption campaign and overseen a major purge of republic officials.

Under *Chernenko*, the Politburo transferred Avgust Voss, who had headed the Latvian party organization for 11 years, to the largely ceremonial post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities and replaced him with Boris Pugo, former head of the Latvian KGB. The 47-year-old Pugo, like Slyun'kov and Bagirov, is not a member of the Central Committee. He spent his early career in party and Komsomol work and did not join the KGB until 1978. In view of his KGB ties, it is possible that Pugo owed his appointment to the influence of Andropov's former allies.

Gorbachev has made two important changes among regional party leaders. Dzhumbar Patiashvili, formerly the Georgian party secretary overseeing agriculture, was named to replace Eduard Shevardnadze—who was transferred to Moscow to become Foreign Minister (see discussion below)—and Yuriy Solov'yev, formerly the Minister of Industrial Construction and Leningrad city party First Secretary, was named to replace Zaykov. Patiashvili has been closely associated with Shevardnadze's innovative economic experiments and reportedly shares Shevardnadze's interest in Hungarian economic reform. Solov'yev had worked closely with both Zaykov and Romanov during his Leningrad career, but presumably he now owes his loyalties to Gorbachev, who sanctioned his promotion. Both men might eventually be in line for elevation to the Politburo if Gorbachev follows past precedent.

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Gorbachev may eventually target several holdovers from the Brezhnev era, particularly in the non-Russian republics where corruption is a major problem. Chernenko's old bailiwick of Moldavia may be an early target for changes in the republic-level party leadership. In December 1983 the Secretariat sharply attacked the Moldavian party organization for its failure to deal with pressing local problems. The criticism strongly echoed a number of Gorbachev's favorite themes and may have been engineered by Gorbachev and Andropov to embarrass Chernenko.

Oblast Party Secretaries

During *Andropov's* incumbency, about 20 percent of the oblast party first secretaries were replaced, a greater number than in any comparable period since early in Brezhnev's tenure. From November 1982 through July 1983, 13 oblast first secretaries who were on the Central Committee changed jobs or retired. Ten of the incumbents were either promoted or transferred to equivalent posts while three stepped down, one probably in disgrace. The pace of retirements and demotions picked up with the reelection campaign that ran from August 1983 to January 1984, when 19 oblast first secretaries and, reportedly, numerous lower level officials were removed from their posts. Twelve members of the Central Committee were affected, of whom six retired for reasons of age or health, four were demoted to slots where they probably will lose their Central Committee seats, and one was transferred laterally.

The newly appointed first secretaries are all in their forties or fifties. Half of the new appointees came from within the oblast and had served either as second secretaries or chairmen of the executive committee of the oblast soviets. In the other cases, the new secretaries came from elsewhere in the republic or, in two cases, from Moscow, a posting pattern that frequently suggests Moscow's dissatisfaction with the local organization.

During *Chernenko's* tenure, only seven oblast first secretaries with Central Committee rank were replaced. Most of the changes were routine in nature,

involving either honorable retirements or lateral transfers (see table 4). One exception to this pattern occurred in July 1984, when Ivan Bondarenko, the 58-year-old secretary in Rostov, retired soon after the central media began reporting widespread corruption in his oblast. His replacement, Aleksandr Vlasov, came from outside the area—another indication that Bondarenko's retirement reflected Politburo dissatisfaction with the local leadership.

Under *Gorbachev*, turnover among oblast first secretaries has again increased, outpacing the turnover during Andropov's first months in office. Within two weeks of Chernenko's death, Ivan Besspalov, the 70-year-old First Secretary of Kirov Oblast, retired and was replaced by an inspector from a Central Committee department. Thirteen other new regional first secretaries have since been named; 10 of these replaced incumbents with Central Committee status and probably can expect to gain full membership at next year's party congress. With party reelections scheduled to begin soon and Gorbachev having publicly called for an acceleration of cadre change, many of the remaining Brezhnev-era holdovers heading oblast party organizations probably feel jeopardized.³

Changes in the Council of Ministers

When *Andropov* came to power, the Council of Ministers was ripe for major personnel changes. Many of the economic ministers had held their posts since the ministries were reestablished in March 1965;⁴ two-thirds were over 65, and many were in their seventies.

however, some senior Politburo members, including Tikhonov and Moscow city party boss Viktor Grishin, opposed wholesale personnel changes in the Council of Ministers. Probably as a result of this

³ Currently, there are nearly 30 kray or oblast first secretaries—most of whom hold Central Committee seats—who probably are at high risk. They are all over age 60 and have served in their posts for over a decade. All but a few are in the Russian Republic.
⁴ Khrushchev had abolished the central ministries in 1957 when he introduced the regional economic councils, or *sovnarkhozy*. Soon after he was ousted from power, the central ministries were reestablished.

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Table 4
Changes Among Regional Party Secretaries
at Central Committee Level

Official	Disposition	Oblast/Kray	Replacement	Date of Action	Replacement's Central Committee Status
Changes During Chernenko's First 11 Months					
V. P. Lomakin	Transferred	Primorskiy	D. N. Gagarov Central Committee Inspector	April 1984	None
I. I. Sen'kin	Transferred	Karelia	V. S. Stepanov Karelian Secretary	April 1984	None
I. A. Bondarenko	Retired	Rostov	A. V. Vlasov First Secretary Chechen-Ingush	July 1984	Full
A. V. Vlasov	Transferred	Chechen-Ingush	V. K. Foteyev Second Secretary Kuybyshev	July 1984	None
Changes During Chernenko's Final Illness, January-February 1985					
Y. N. Auyel'bekov	Transferred	Turgay	O. S. Kuanyshev First Secretary Kokchetav	January 1985	Candidate
M. M. Musakhanov	Retired	Tashkent	T. A. Alimov Chairman Tashkent Soviet Executive Committee	January 1985	None
N. F. Aksenov	Died	Altay	F. V. Popov RSFSR Minister of Housing	February 1985	None
Changes Under Gorbachev					
I. P. Bespalov	Retired	Kirov	V. V. Bakatin Central Committee Inspector	March 1985	None
V. K. Gusev	Transferred	Saratov	A. A. Khomyakov First Secretary Tambov Oblast	March 1985	Full
L. A. Gorshkov	Transferred	Kemerovo	N. S. Yermakov First Deputy Chief CPSU Heavy Indus- try Energy Depart- ment	March 1985	None
V. A. Mikulich	Probably demoted	Minsk	A. A. Malofeyev First Secretary Gomel' Oblast	March 1985	None
A. A. Khomyakov	Transferred	Tambov	Ye. M. Podol'skiy Chairman Tambov Oblast Soviet Execu- tive Committee	April 1985	None
B. N. Yel'tsin	Transferred	Sverdlovsk	Yu. V. Petrov Deputy Chief CPSU Party Organs Department	April 1985	None
F. K. Knyazev	Retired	Kurgan	A. N. Plekhanov CPSU Inspector	June 1985	None

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Table 4
Changes Among Regional Party Secretaries
at Central Committee Level (continued)

Official	Disposition	Oblast/Kray	Replacement	Date of Action	Replacement's Central Committee Status
F. S. Meshkov	Retired	Orel	Ye. S. Stroyev CPSU Inspector	June 1985	None
S. S. Avramenko	Retired	Amur	L. V. Sharin CPSU Inspector	July 1985	None
A. A. Askarov	Fired	Chimkent	R. Myrzashev Chairman Soviet Executive Committee Pavlodar Oblast	July 1985	None
L. N. Zaykov	Transferred	Leningrad	Yu. F. Solov'yev Minister of Industrial Construction	July 1985	Full

high-level opposition, several ministers who were severely criticized during Andropov's tenure—for example, Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy Ivan Kazanets and Minister of Nonferrous Metallurgy Petr Lomako—escaped Andropov's axe. Under *Chernenko* the economic ministers generally enjoyed security of tenure. Since *Gorbachev* came to power, four ministers and a deputy premier have been retired and Soviet officials are predicting sweeping changes in the Council of Ministers.

The Presidium

Despite the Politburo old guard's opposition to bolder moves, there were some important personnel changes in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers during *Andropov's* brief tenure. He engineered the demotion of one deputy premier, Valentin Makeyev, who had served under Grishin as Second Secretary of the Moscow city party, and the forced retirement of another, Ignatij Novikov, who also headed the State Committee for Construction.⁵ Andropov also presided over the promotion of Aliyev and Gromyko as First Deputy Premiers. The promotion of Aliyev may have allowed Andropov to work around Premier Tikhonov, who reportedly favored a more cautious approach to the economy's problems than that of the General

Secretary. Aliyev was given responsibility for solving the country's serious transportation problems. Gromyko's promotion probably was designed to reward him for his political support and to strengthen Andropov's political base in the Council of Ministers.

Under *Chernenko*, only one official, Yakov Ryabov, was promoted to the rank of deputy premier. Ryabov, the onetime party secretary for defense industries, had moved to Gosplan in 1979. Under Andropov, Ryabov was named to head the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, while Lev Voronin, a former defense industry specialist, took over his responsibilities at Gosplan. In September 1984 Ryabov was named to replace the late Deputy Premier Leonid Kostandov—a promotion that may have been attributable to support from party secretary Ryzhkov, another former Gosplan First Deputy Chairman from Sverdlovsk.

Gorbachev has so far made two personnel changes in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. In May, Gorbachev fired Deputy Premier and former Moldavian party boss Ivan Bodyul, and, in July, Gromyko was removed as First Deputy Premier in conjunction with his election as President.

⁵ Novikov's retirement followed extensive public criticism on the construction progress at the Atommash factory in Volgodonsk.

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Geydar Aliyev and Andrey Gromyko, First Deputy Premiers appointed by Andropov.

out the railroads and other elements of the transportation system. Soon after Aliyev's move to Moscow, Railway Minister Ivan Pavlovskiy was fired and replaced by his deputy, Nikolay Konarev. Aliyev has apparently had some success, particularly in 1983 and 1984, and improved performance by the transportation sector has contributed to a modest upswing in economic growth.

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Construction. Five senior positions in the construction sector changed hands under Andropov, one more change occurred immediately following his death, and two changes have occurred since Gorbachev came to power. All of the newly appointed officials had backgrounds in construction. Several came from the Siberian oil and gas sector, which party secretary Dolgikh oversees, suggesting that Dolgikh may have played a role in their promotions.

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Machine Building. Five ministers responsible for machine building have retired since 1982, and one other change involved a lateral transfer. Two of the new officials appointed to civilian machine-building ministries have some connection to the defense sector, and their appointments may have reflected a deliberate effort to tap the talents of experienced managers from the defense sector to help improve the performance of the rest of the economy. The Minister of Heavy and Transport Machine Building, Sergey Afanas'yev, appointed under Andropov, came from a ministry responsible for missile development. Lev Vasil'yev, the former director of the Kama Motor Vehicle Production Association—a producer of trucks for the Soviet military—was named Minister of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances under Chernenko.

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Economic Officials

Overall, about two dozen important economic officials represented on the Central Committee have been affected by personnel changes since Brezhnev's death (see table 5). Seven of these moves involved either lateral transfers or promotions, but the majority involved demotions or retirements of elderly officials appointed under Brezhnev. Those who retired were nearly all in their seventies, with an average of nearly 15 years in their posts; most of their replacements are in their late forties or fifties. The transport, construction, and machine-building sectors were significantly affected by the personnel changes under Andropov. More recently, a shakeup of the energy sector that began in Chernenko's final months has affected three key ministries and may broaden further under Gorbachev, given the continued criticism of certain sectors, such as coal.

Transportation. Andropov entrusted First Deputy Premier Aliyev with the difficult task of straightening

Energy. Chernenko's final months in office also resulted in major personnel changes in the petroleum industry, which had been sharply criticized in the Soviet media for allowing output to drop. In February 1985 Nikolay Mal'tsev, Minister of the Petroleum Industry, retired and was replaced by Vasilii Dinkov, the highly successful Minister of the Gas Industry. Dinkov, in turn, was replaced by one of his former deputies. Mal'tsev was only a candidate member of the Central Committee, but, given the importance the

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Table 5
Key Economic Personnel Appointments

Name	Position	Date of Appointment
Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers		
Geydar Aliyev	First Deputy Premier	November 1982
Andrey Gromyko	First Deputy Premier	March 1983
Boris Shcherbina	Deputy Premier	January 1984
Yakob Ryabov	Deputy Premier	September 1984
Construction Sector		
V. D. Danilenko	Minister of Rural Construction	December 1982
S. V. Bashilov	Chairman, State Committee for Construction Affairs	July 1983
V. G. Chirskov	Minister of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises	January 1984
L. A. Bibin	First Deputy Chairman (for Construction), Gosplan	January 1984
Yu. F. Solov'yev	Minister of Industrial Construction	March 1984
V. A. Brezhnev	Minister of Transport Construction	May 1985
Machine-Building Sector		
S. A. Afanas'yev	Minister of Heavy and Transport Machine Building	April 1983
O. D. Baklanov	Minister of General Machine Building	April 1983
V. M. Velichko	Minister of Power Machine Building	December 1983
I. S. Belousov	Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry	January 1984
L. B. Vasil'yev	Minister of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances	May 1984
G. P. Voronskiy	Minister of the Electrical Equipment Industry	May 1985
Energy Sector		
V. A. Dinkov	Minister of the Petroleum Industry	January 1985
V. S. Chernomyoin	Minister of the Gas Industry	January 1985
A. I. Mayorets	Minister of Power and Electrification	March 1985
Other Postings		
N. S. Konarev	Minister of Railways	November 1982
V. P. Nikonov	RSFSR Minister of Agriculture	January 1983
G. I. Vashchenko	Minister of Trade	January 1983
M. P. Trunov	Chairman, Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives	February 1983
Yu. P. Batalin	Chairman, State Committee for Labor and Social Problems	April 1983
N. A. Petrovichev	Chairman, State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education	July 1983
Ye. I. Sizenko	Minister of Meat and Dairy Industry	January 1984
M. A. Sergeychik	Chairman, State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations	September 1984
V. V. Nikitin	RSFSR Minister of Agriculture	May 1985
S. V. Kolpakov	Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy	July 1985
V. G. Klyuyev	Minister of Light Industry	July 1985

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Politburo attaches to dealing with the petroleum industry's problems, Dinkov probably will gain full membership as a result of his new assignment. Both moves probably reflected the influence of Gorbachev, who [] was chairing both the Politburo and the Secretariat during Chernenko's final months. This reshuffle was followed in March by the retirement of longtime Minister of Power and Electrification Petr Neporozhnyi and his replacement by Minister of the Electrical Equipment Industry Anatoliy Mayorets, whose work has been praised by Gorbachev. []

National Security Ministries

Under Andropov there were few high-level personnel changes in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Defense (MOD). This stability of cadres may have reflected the political influence that Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov enjoyed during Andropov's tenure. Both men reportedly supported Andropov in his bid to become General Secretary. Under Chernenko the pace of turnover in the military stepped up, but the Foreign Ministry remained largely unaffected by cadre change. Gorbachev's first few months in office have resulted in a major change in the foreign policy apparatus: Gromyko's posting to the office of President and Georgian party boss Shevardnadze's designation as Foreign Minister. []

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The most noteworthy changes in the MFA under *Andropov* were among Soviet ambassadors to Eastern Europe—positions that are effectively party posts and that fall under the General Secretary's control. With the exception of Ambassador Nikolay Rodionov in Belgrade, all these ambassadors were replaced after Brezhnev's death.

[] Despite Andropov's presumed dissatisfaction with them, the incumbents were almost all rewarded with a sinecure. Petr Abrasimov, for example, moved from Berlin, where he had been disliked, to become chairman of a new State Committee for Foreign Tourism, and Boris Aristov moved from Warsaw to become deputy foreign minister. []

Andropov also presided over a reshuffling of some key foreign service postings in non-Bloc countries. Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko from Paris joined the Central Committee apparatus, replacing Nikolay Pegov as head of the Cadres Abroad Department. Chervonenko's move caused several other shifts. Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov moved from New Delhi to Paris, and Ambassador Vasiliy Rykov moved from Algeria to assume Vorontsov's old post. []

Also, within a month after Andropov came to power, Mikhail Kapitsa was promoted to deputy foreign minister for Asian affairs and Viktor Komplektov became deputy minister with responsibility for US-Soviet relations. Both promotions were almost certainly due primarily to Gromyko's influence. []

Under *Chernenko*, numerous Soviet officials noted the growing influence of Gromyko over both policy and personnel as a result of the inexperience and frailty of Chernenko. Only one important personnel change was made, probably reflecting Gromyko's clout. Abrasimov, whose hardline approach seems close to Gromyko's but who was apparently not in favor with Andropov, was named to the important post of Ambassador to Japan early this year. []

Gorbachev, in a major personnel move, orchestrated Gromyko's elevation to the post of President in July 1985 and appointed Georgian First Secretary Shevardnadze—a man lacking in foreign policy experience—to head the Foreign Ministry. []

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
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Shevardnadze's limited public statements on foreign policy have hewed closely to the prevailing line. Presumably Shevardnadze, because of his inexperience in foreign affairs, will be more amenable to guidance from the General Secretary than was Gromyko, who headed the ministry for 28 years and,

had become an impediment to policy change. Shevardnadze— will certainly project a different image than the dour Gromyko. His innovative approach to domestic policy, including advocacy of East European economic reform (see inset), may also carry over into his style as Foreign Minister. In his first statements as Foreign Minister, he has stressed the possibility of a return to detente and hailed the upcoming US-Soviet summit as a major opportunity to improve relations.

Ministry of Defense. The Politburo made no significant personnel changes in the MOD under *Andropov*, but several top officers, including First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Sergey Akhromeyev and Ground Forces Commander in Chief Vasilii Petrov, were promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union. At the June 1983 plenum, Akhromeyev and Deputy Defense Minister Vitaliy Shabanov were also promoted from candidate to full membership in the Central Committee.

Under *Chernenko*, the pace of personnel change in the MOD accelerated. In June 1984 Vladimir Govorov, Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Troops, was appointed deputy defense minister and assigned to the Chief Inspectorate to replace 83-year-old Marshal

Kirill Moskalenko. Govorov's post in the Far East was taken by Ivan Tret'yak, the former commander of the Far East Military District, who was already a full member of the Central Committee.

A more significant change came in early September 1984, when Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov was transferred from his posts of Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister to become Commander in Chief of Forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations.⁶ While a demotion for Ogarkov, this newly created post gives him responsibilities similar to those of the Far Eastern command, and he will almost certainly retain his Central Committee seat.

While there are various rumors explaining Ogarkov's transfer, and we are uncertain about the actual cause, it may have been the opening move in the battle to succeed Defense Minister Ustinov.

Although Akhromeyev, Ogarkov's replacement as Chief of the General Staff, was probably a contender, the Politburo ultimately replaced Ustinov with 73-year-old Sergey Sokolov, the oldest of Ustinov's first deputies. Sokolov has been a full member of the Central Committee since 1968.

Sokolov's promotion has caused additional personnel changes in the Defense Ministry. In January 1985 Marshal Petrov, Commander of Ground Forces, succeeded Sokolov as a First Deputy Defense Minister. Army General Yevgeniy Ivanovskiy, in turn, was promoted to deputy defense minister and Ground Forces Commander. Both Petrov and Ivanovskiy are full members of the Central Committee.

Under *Gorbachev*, Sokolov was given candidate Politburo status at the April Central Committee plenum. His advancement probably was intended to improve Gorbachev's ties to the military, with which the new General Secretary has had little professional contact.



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At the same time, unlike Ligachev and Ryzhkov, the Defense Minister did not advance directly to full Politburo status. Sokolov may never become a full Politburo member—a status that both his predecessors enjoyed. He probably will never enjoy the same political influence as Defense Minister Ustinov, whose contribution to Soviet defense for over 40 years has been unrivaled. [REDACTED]

The Police Apparatus

The law enforcement agencies—the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB—were subjected to a major shakeup during *Andropov's* tenure. In December 1982 Andropov dismissed Minister of Internal Affairs Shchelokov, a Brezhnev associate who had largely ignored the corruption among senior political officials, and replaced him with Vitaliy Fedorchuk, who had succeeded Andropov in May 1982 as KGB chief.

Simultaneously, Andropov's former first deputy, Viktor Chebrikov, was promoted to head of the KGB. Shortly before Andropov's death, Chebrikov was further promoted to candidate member of the Politburo.

The promotion of Chebrikov to candidate member probably was designed to strengthen Andropov's power base while also giving the KGB the clout required to pursue the anticorruption campaign. [REDACTED]

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
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Two Andropov appointees, Minister of Internal Affairs Fedorchuk (left) and KGB chief Chebrikov. [redacted]

Fedorchuk, who is not yet a member of the Central Committee, came to Moscow from the Ukraine, where he headed the republic's KGB. [redacted]

Chernenko presided over two major personnel changes in the police agencies. In December 1984 Vasily Trushin, a secretary from the Moscow city committee, replaced Brezhnev's son-in-law Yuriy Churbanov as First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. Churbanov, who was a candidate member of the Central Committee, will almost certainly lose his committee seat as a result of his demotion. Soviet media have also reported that Nikolay Yemokhonov—a former deputy chairman of the KGB who is a technical specialist in communications—has assumed Chebrikov's former post as KGB First Deputy Chairman. He presumably stands a good chance of being promoted to Chebrikov's old slot on the Central Committee at the next party congress. [redacted]

Since Gorbachev came to power, KGB Chairman Chebrikov has been elevated to full membership in the Politburo. [redacted]

[redacted] His promotion so soon after Gorbachev's succession suggests that the new General Secretary regards him as a key ally. His advancement also increases the KGB's prestige—as was the case between 1973 and 1982, when KGB chief Andropov was a full member of the Politburo. [redacted]

Prospects for Further Changes

Gorbachev's early personnel actions suggest that the process of cadre change will accelerate. A *Pravda* editorial this June, for instance, warned that "neither past services nor a long time spent in the leadership can be considered a passport to a new term in office" for those who are not up to the current economic tasks. [redacted]

Gorbachev probably will focus his early cadre renewal efforts on poor performers in the party and economic apparatus. To further these efforts, he will eventually want to retire Premier Tikhonov, who is 80 years old and has reportedly been a major obstacle to personnel change in the Council of Ministers. Rumors of Tikhonov's retirement have circulated since Brezhnev's death, and the departure of Chernenko—a fellow Brezhnev crony—makes Tikhonov's retirement more likely. Such a move could come as early as sometime this year, despite his identification publicly as a rapporteur at next year's party congress. [redacted]

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Tikhonov's departure would open the way for the retirement of many of the Brezhnev-era holdovers in the economic bureaucracy. Currently, three deputy premiers and nine economic ministers have held their posts for over 20 years and may be good candidates for retirement before the party congress. Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Baybakov, who is 75, may be a particularly attractive target for removal; several Soviet officials have alleged that he, like Tikhonov, is a major obstacle to economic reform. In light of his background in economic management and his close political ties to Gorbachev, party secretary Ryzhkov might be a good candidate for Baybakov's post, [REDACTED]

Many of the ministers in the energy, chemical, and metallurgical sectors who were criticized under Andropov but managed to escape the axe could also be forcibly retired in the upcoming months. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev may also remove the remaining Brezhnev-era holdovers in the central party apparatus, where three chiefs of economic departments have held their posts since the 1960s. This would make it possible for Gorbachev not only to promote better educated, more managerially oriented officials but also to increase the weight of underrepresented groups on the Central Committee and broaden his political base. A recent article on cadre policy by Gorbachev protege Georgiy Razumovskiy—now head of the party's department overseeing personnel matters—emphasized the need to increase the number of women in positions of authority. Gorbachev himself has suggested that he intends to increase the role of non-Russian personnel in the Moscow-based bureaucracy as well as in the Soviet republics. [REDACTED]

Gorbachev may also push ahead with additional changes in foreign policy personnel both in the party and the foreign ministry now that Gromyko has been eased aside. Both party secretaries responsible for foreign affairs, Boris Ponomarev and Konstantin Ruskov, are over age 75 and probably will retire soon. The Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolay Patolichev and several of the deputy foreign ministers are over retirement age and might also be replaced. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Bureaucratic resistance could, of course, slow Gorbachev's progress in making personnel changes. There are some signs already—including the delays in publishing some of his speeches and some toning down of his more controversial remarks—that not all his colleagues are comfortable with his freewheeling style. A successful blocking action could materialize if he makes a major misstep. In the short term, however, such an outcome seems unlikely. Gorbachev is currently on the political offensive, having ousted Romanov, his chief rival; installed Ligachev as "second secretary"; promoted Gromyko; and outflanked the Brezhnev old guard by advancing a number of his allies in the Politburo and Secretariat. The timing of the party congress early next year gives him an ideal opportunity to make further changes in key positions and install his supporters to qualify for Central Committee membership. Gorbachev can also appeal to the enthusiasm of those elements committed to reinvigorating the system and making it work more efficiently—including many who have been waiting impatiently for their superiors to retire—to strengthen his political base and push through his policies. His initial efforts and his early political successes suggest that he does not intend to let the opportunity slip from his grasp. [REDACTED]

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